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Emma Bond
IRONY AS A WAY OF LIFE: SVEVO, KIERKEGAARD, AND 
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Abstract. Dejected by decades of commercial and critical failure, the 
Triestine author Italo Svevo found fresh inspiration for his final novel 
(La coscienza di Zeno, 1923) in the writings of Freud. Yet critics have 
always puzzled over his declared intransigence toward his new master, 
often attributing this ambivalence to a simple defense mechanism. But 
what if Svevo had been reading other works simultaneously, works that 
challenged and exposed the weaknesses of psychoanalytic authority? As 
this article argues, Svevo’s recently discovered reading of Kierkegaard’s 
“existential irony” sheds light on his conception of the power of both 
narrative and the analytical process itself.
“To create fiction is, in fact, a way to abolish reality.”1
I
The main title of this article departs from a statement made by Andrew Cross in the chapter he wrote for The Cambridge Companion 
to Kierkegaard, “Neither Either nor Or: the Perils of Reflexive Irony,” 
which must surely suggest a tantalizing read for anyone familiar with the 
writings of Italo Svevo (1861–1928). In his chapter, Cross posits Søren 
Kierkegaard’s theorizing of irony as “not just a verbal strategy, but a 
way of life.”2 It is, of course, commonly accepted that Kierkegaard’s writ-
ing is characterized by various forms of intentional and self-conscious 
verbal indirectness, some of which will be explored in this article. But 
beyond irony as a speech mode or rhetorical device, Cross argues that 
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for Kierkegaard (and indeed for many of his contemporaries and near-
contemporaries) irony “indicates a particular way of engaging in public 
(interpersonal) activity in general,” and that what really fascinates the 
Danish philosopher is examining “what it is to live ironically—to manifest 
in one’s life, unqualifiedly, the attitudes and type of orientation toward 
the world that constitute irony” (Cross, p. 126). What Cross is looking 
to identify within Kierkegaard’s work, then, is an existential irony, his self-
positioning as an ironist “all the way down” (close, therefore, to what 
D. C. Muecke has called a “general ironist,”3 and how Muecke believed 
that such an attitude could offer improved self-understanding and 
maturation, ultimately leading toward “the awakening of subjectivity”4).
My aim in the present analysis is to identify within Svevo’s writing—
most closely in his characterization of his alter-ego protagonist Zeno 
Cosini in the 1923 novel La coscienza di Zeno (Zeno’s Conscience)—some 
aspects and expressions of this Kierkegaardian “ironic way of life.” I 
start by detailing Svevo’s discovery of Kierkegaard, thus directly linking 
the two writers, and then expand on some specific elements within 
Kiekegaard’s conception of irony that lend themselves to comparative 
analysis. I am not looking to map these affirmations and ideas exactly 
onto Svevo’s texts, but rather to tease out areas of convergence and 
fissures of difference that might serve to illuminate aspects of the struc-
ture and spirit behind the work of the Triestine author. I conclude by 
suggesting that this ironist position serves also to shed light on Svevo’s 
narrative employment of psychoanalysis, which seems to take him radi-
cally beyond those writings of Freud that provided direct inspiration 
for his novel and toward anticipating later works of Jacques Lacan on 
language, and ultimately even shedding light on the essentially ironic 
nature of the analytical process itself.
II
First I want to briefly summarize why the link between Svevo and 
Kierkegaard is of such topical interest. For a long time it was assumed 
that the fire damage caused by Allied bombing at the end of the Second 
World War had entirely consumed the library at Villa Veneziani, Svevo’s 
home in Trieste, and that the only books belonging to him that survived 
were some gifts and personal editions of his own works that had been 
rescued by his wife. But a chance discovery in 2011 by Simone Volpato, 
a researcher at the University of Trieste, uncovered seventy-one volumes 
that had been catalogued as part of the collection belonging to Svevo’s 
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son-in-law (Antonio Fonda Savio), but were then revealed to have 
belonged to Svevo himself. Not only were all signed “Ettore” (Svevo’s 
real first name), but many had been scrupulously annotated as well.
This discovery was brought fully into the public arena in 2013 with 
the publication of Volpato and Riccardo Cepach’s Alla peggio andrò in 
biblioteca: I libri ritrovati di Italo Svevo, which granted an invaluable snap-
shot into this collection of books that Svevo had personally bought, read, 
and reflected on, thus shedding light on an important fragment of his 
cultural, literary, and philosophical formation.5 From the scholarship 
in this volume we learn that Svevo came into possession of the German 
translation of Either/Or in 1909; its first part, the “Papers of A.,” is the 
most heavily annotated text in the Fonda Savio collection.
Several things emerge from an analysis of Svevo’s reading of 
Kierkegaard that are of great significance and that resonate with the 
composition of La coscienza, not only structurally (the assumption of 
authorial pseudonyms, for example, or the first-person, diaristic style) 
but also as an absolutely fundamental influence on the narrative phi-
losophy behind the novel itself, in its slippery dissolution of the author/
narrator/protagonist figures, which anticipates later poststructuralist or 
even postmodern matrices, and its consequent “betrayal” of the author-
reader pact, both of which reside in that common appraisal of irony as 
the existential reconceptualization of subjectivity-in-the-world suggested 
at the outset of this article. Since Svevo does not seem to have been 
familiar with Kierkegaard’s earlier written works on irony (particularly On 
the Concept of Irony [1841]), nor his later ones (the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments [1846]), these will not form a major 
part of my analysis; rather, I will focus on the ideas that emerge from 
Either/Or and relate them, where necessary or appropriate, to other works.
Yet even this more limited scope of reference offers an exciting new 
addition to our understanding of Svevo’s philosophical trajectory, which 
to date had assumed a chronological lacuna from the publication of 
the Schopenhauerian-inspired Una vita (1892) to his discovery of Freud 
between 1908 and 1910, which led to the composition of La coscienza 
in the aftermath of the First World War. We now know that alongside 
Freud, Svevo was reading Kierkegaard (possibly even at the same time), 
and it is fascinating to reflect on how his reception of these two texts 
intertwines—perhaps most revealingly around the pole of irony.
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III
As stated above, the first narrative technique that aligns Svevo and 
Kierkegaard is the inclusion of a sort of dual authorship within their 
respective texts. Either/Or is posited to have been “written” by two ficti-
tious authors; the first part contains the supposed diary of a third, and 
the second contains a sermon by a fourth, and all are presented by 
a pseudonymous editor in the fictitious preface. The narrative of La 
coscienza di Zeno has a similarly complex framing device. The purloined 
manuscript is introduced in the ambiguously stated preface by Zeno’s 
analyst, Dottor S., which is itself followed by the obliquely “fictitious” 
memories (the self-confessed tante bugie [many lies]6) that Zeno produces 
through ambivalence and countertransference; the memories’ reliability 
is thus shattered for both analyst and reader.7
Related to this narrative structuring is Kierkegaard’s extratextual 
device of employing authorial polynymity. Critics have generally seen 
his prolific pseudonyms as free, even contradictory, agents—yet have 
accepted that the polynymity he assumes is not merely a game but 
rather carefully designed to orient the “ghost-written” works within a 
constructed philosophical framework. But as Alastair Hannay points out, 
Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonymity also allows him to disown authority 
for what he writes: “It scrambles the author-reader link in a way that 
allows the writings to enjoy a genuinely independent existence, letting 
them become considerations in the mind of the reader.”8
As I will argue, we could see Svevo adopting a similar strategy toward 
authorial authority and responsibility. He does this through his lifelong 
adoption of pseudonyms (from his given name of Ettore Schmitz, to 
E. Samigli, Ettore Muranese, and finally Italo Svevo), and through the 
related alter egos (of Alfonso, Emilio, Zeno, and even Dottor S.) that 
weave an autobiographically inspired narrative voice throughout his 
works.9
IV
Delving more deeply into specific details, which elements of 
Kierkegaard’s vast range of ironic statements and practices in the “Papers 
of A.” particularly caught Svevo’s eye (indicated by what he had marked 
or underlined in his copy of Either/Or), and where can we see their 
influence in La coscienza di Zeno?
The first statement I want to explore seems to echo the double prem-
ise of La coscienza di Zeno itself: the need or desire for self-evaluation 
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(the process of “auto-analisi” famously inspired by Freudian practice), 
and the screen issue of Zeno’s tobacco addiction. For example, Svevo 
underlined the following statement by A.: “One should be an enigma 
not just to others but to oneself too. I study myself. When I’m tired of 
that I light a cigar to pass the time, and think: God only knows what 
the good Lord really meant with me, or what He meant to make of me” 
(E/O, p. 47). Zeno, of course, is a notoriously resistant patient, one who 
would doubtless second this insistence on the importance of remaining 
an “enigma” to oneself. As Svevo himself wrote in a similar vein: “I didn’t 
care for psychoanalysis as a cure. I was healthy or at least I loved my 
illness (if it is one) so much that I wanted to hold on to it in the spirit 
of self-defense” (Come cura a me [la psicanalisi] non importava. Io ero 
sano o almeno amavo tanto la mia malattia [se c’è] da preservarmela 
con intero spirito di autodifesa).10
And spurred on by Dottor S.’s encouragement of his free-association 
practice, Zeno ties his resistance firmly to his smoking, saying: “Now that 
I am here, analyzing myself, I am seized by a suspicion: Did I perhaps 
love cigarettes so much because they enabled me to blame them for 
my clumsiness?” (ZC, p. 12) (Adesso che sono qui, ad analizzarmi, sono 
colto da un dubbio: che io forse abbia amato tanto la sigaretta per poter 
riversare su di essa la colpa della mia incapacità? [CZ, p. 11]). He also 
more generally posits analysis as a practice that is capable only of con-
verting health into illness: “I am analyzing [Augusta’s] health, but I fail, 
because I realize that in analyzing it I convert it into sickness” (ZC, p. 
158) (Io sto analizzando [la salute di Augusta], ma non ci riesco perché 
mi accorgo che, analizzandola, la converto in malattia [CZ, p. 148]). 
Interpretation is seen as praxis rather than goal, and one besides that 
might (ideally?) tie in more with strategies of resistance or avoidance 
than offer a positive cure or definitive answer.
The next citation that Svevo underlined within the “Papers of A.” 
cannot help but recall the famously ironic episode in La coscienza where 
Zeno follows the wrong carriage to his brother-in-law Guido’s funeral 
and ends up missing the burial itself. “How empty life is and without 
meaning. We bury a man, we follow him to the grave, we throw three 
spades of earth on him, we ride out in a coach, we ride home in a coach, 
we take comfort in the thought that a long life awaits us. But how long 
is threescore years and ten?” (E/O, pp. 48–49). The way that death, as 
well as the social conventions surrounding its commemoration, high-
lights the futility of life itself is perhaps echoed in Ada’s dismissal of the 
stock market activities that (perhaps too) conveniently prevented Zeno 
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from attending her husband’s funeral. “Thanks to what you’ve done, he 
actually died for something that wasn’t worth it!” (ZC, p. 396) (Così hai 
fatto in modo ch’egli è morto proprio per una cosa che non ne valeva 
la pena! [CZ, p. 375]).
The dynamic of rivalry between the two men seems to have inspired 
Zeno to render Guido’s death empty and without meaning, since his 
own failure imbues Zeno with a hitherto unknown sense of success. “I 
was all health and strength. Health is evident only through comparison. 
I compared myself to poor Guido and I climbed, higher and higher, 
with my victory in the very struggle where he had fallen” (ZC, p. 392) 
(Ero tutto salute e forza. La salute non risalta che da un paragone. Mi 
paragonavo a Guido e salivo, salivo in alto con la mia vittoria nella stessa 
lotta nella quale egli era soggiaciuto [CZ, p. 371]).
But Kierkegaard’s reference to death also draws in a wider preoccupa-
tion with mortality that underpins the narrative of La coscienza di Zeno 
as a whole—as Zeno says, death is “the true organizer of life. I thought 
always of death, and therefore I had only . . . the certainty of having to 
die” (ZC, p. 79) (la vera organizzatrice della vita. Io sempre alla morte 
pensavo e perciò non avevo che . . . la certezza di dover morire [CZ, p. 
73]). As we have seen, the defeat of death can be temporarily countered 
by the illusion of relationality that Kierkegaard highlights above, and 
which is enacted by Zeno’s relations with his own father, his father-in-law 
Giovanni Malfenti, and (particularly) Guido, his rival in love.11
A further element of striking commonality between the two texts is in 
their discourses on pleasure, which highlight a maximum sense of attain-
ment as being linked not to the sensation of pleasure itself but rather to 
an awareness of victory, or of achieving one’s own will. As Kierkegaard 
writes: “Pleasure consists not in what I enjoy but in having my way” (E/O, 
p. 49, emphasis added). Zeno mimics this in his retelling of the story 
of his courtship of Ada, “I dreamed of victory rather than of love” (ZC, 
p. 102) (Sognavo la vittoria invece che l’amore [CZ, p. 95]); as well as 
in his relationship with Guido, where—as anticipated above—his fullest 
delight is to be found not in the enjoyment of a certain camaraderie or 
friendship but rather in a sense of having succeeded in “imposing his 
own will” (ZC, p. 147) on the other (imporre la volontà [CZ, p. 138]).
In keeping with the subject of retelling or recollecting events, mem-
ory is another shared concern between the two texts, particularly the 
influence of recollection on time and reality. A. states: “For me noth-
ing is more dangerous than recollection. Once I have recalled some 
life-situation it ceases to exist. . . . A life in recollection is the most 
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perfect imaginable; memory gives you your fill more abundantly than 
all of reality and has security which no reality possesses. A life-situation 
recalled has already passed into eternity and has no more temporal 
interest” (E/O, p. 50). This may recall, to name but one example, the 
crystallization of memory into narrative that Zeno evokes when trying 
to remember to what extent the stories he told the Malfenti sisters dur-
ing his courtship of Ada were true or not: “They were true inasmuch 
as I could not have told them in any other version. Today it’s of no 
importance to me to prove their veracity” (ZC, p. 84) (Erano vere dal 
momento che io non avrei più saputo raccontarle altrimenti. Oggidì 
non m’importa di provarne la verità [CZ, p. 78]). But these comments 
also indicate more generally how the process of psychoanalysis and the 
recuperation of memory through image leads to a falsification of the 
past that persists into the present: “Thus, after pursuing those images, I 
overtook them. Now I know that I invented them” (ZC, p. 404) (È così 
che a forza di correr dietro a quelle immagini, io le raggiunsi. Ora so 
di averle inventate [CZ, p. 382]).12
But most of all, what unites the two texts is their shared position of 
laughter in relation to life. As Kierkegaard writes: “When I was very young 
I forgot in the cave of Trophonius how to laugh; when I became older, 
when I opened my eyes and saw reality, I started to laugh and haven’t 
stopped since” (E/O, p. 51). This last quotation, I think, perfectly aligns 
Kierkegaard’s conception of irony with that put forward by Zeno Cosini 
in La coscienza. Indeed, this citation shows the characteristics of verbal 
irony (as rhetorical practice)—the contradiction between internal and 
external perception and meaning, and the positioning of detachment 
and superiority to the other and to everyday life—but it also uses them 
as an orientation toward existence in general. In this regard, Zeno 
recalls that his father has two things that he can legitimately reproach 
him for: “my absentmindedness and my tendency to laugh at the most 
serious matters” (ZC, p. 34, emphasis added) (la mia distrazione e la mia 
tendenza di ridere delle cose più serie [CZ, p. 32, emphasis added]).
This detachment is what allows both Either/Or and La coscienza to 
maintain their status as texts that occupy a dynamic force field of shift-
ing significance. Indeed, Cross speaks specifically of an “internal ten-
sion that renders the ironist’s way of life unstable, self-undetermining” 
(Cross, p. 127), and Muecke notes that the general ironist has a need 
and a capacity for endless revision and self-correction, for questioning 
and suspending judgment, for living “hypothetically and subjectively 
. . . and keeping alive an infinity of possibilities” (Muecke, p. 129). This 
438 Philosophy and Literature
also correlates with the third of Brian Moloney’s definition of three 
interlocking but distinct levels of irony within La coscienza: the irony 
of events mysteriously turning out for the best; Zeno’s self-deprecating 
irony, which absolves him from any blame; and the irony of his own 
self-betrayal,13 where irony functions for Zeno as a means to “readily 
evade the difficulties of direct expression.”14
V
This evasion, I would argue, is also where the figure of the 
Kierkegaardian ironist comes into contact with the praxis of psychoanaly-
sis within La coscienza di Zeno. For what Kierkegaard practices has been 
described by Cross as “radical verbal irony,” or “saying something that 
can be taken in a variety of ways, where the speaker is only interested 
in producing riddles which do not commit him, in the sense that he 
cannot be held to account. . . . His only interest is in luxuriating in the 
freedom that comes from playing at conversation, tossing out statements 
that can be taken in a variety of ways, and letting the hearer who takes 
this to be a real conversation flounder among interpretative possibili-
ties” (Cross, pp. 131–32). The emphasis here is on freedom, since the 
speaker’s aim is no longer genuinely communicative, even though he 
might pretend that this had been his initial intention (since he did at 
least start off by engaging in a speech act).
This is why Kierkegaard’s A., as well as Svevo’s Zeno, must both be 
described as ironists rather than simply ironic speakers (so therefore 
living ironically rather than just speaking ironically). Both are figures 
who outwardly engage in interaction while “inwardly repudiating its 
goals and treating it all as a kind of game”: “Rather than engage with 
his social world either by taking part in or criticizing it, he lifts himself 
out of it altogether” (Cross, p. 134). Thus, irony allows the subject to 
disassociate himself from himself, from the social, embodied person 
that he has been and now merely plays at being. We see evidence of 
this in another passage from the “Papers of A.” that Svevo underlined: 
“Of all the ridiculous things in the world what strikes me as the most 
ridiculous of all is being busy in the world, to be a man quick to his 
meals and quick to his work. So when, at the crucial moment, I see a 
fly settle on such a businessman’s nose, . . . or a tile falls from the roof 
and strikes him dead, I laugh from the bottom of my heart. And who 
could help laughing?” (E/O, p. 46).
439 Emma Bond
Similarly, Zeno succeeds in lifting himself out of the struggle for life 
that defeated both his literary predecessors Alfonso and Emilio (to 
varying extents) through the sort of laughter that is engendered by an 
existential ironistic position.15 Yet it is also important to conceptualize 
this laughter as part of a greater strategy of resistance that realigns 
Kierkegaard with Freud within the narrative structure of La coscienza. 
As Zeno says in response to Dottor S.’s “diagnosis” that he suffers from 
the Oedipus complex, “I laugh at it wholeheartedly” (ZC, p. 403) (Ne 
rido di cuore [CZ, p. 381]).
The ironic position of detachment from society and interaction here 
also mimics Zeno’s insistence on his own illness and rejection of any 
sort of related “cure”: “I am bent on recovering from his therapy. I 
avoid dreams and memories. Thanks to them, my poor head has been 
so transformed that it doesn’t feel secure on my neck. I have frightful 
distractions” (ZC, pp. 417–18) (Sono intento a guarire dalla sua cura. 
Evito i sogni ed i ricordi. Per essi la mia povera testa si è trasformata in 
modo da non saper sentirsi sicura sul collo. Ho delle distrazioni spav-
entose [CZ, p. 395]). By enacting a successful resistance to diagnosis 
and cure, Zeno subsequently declares: “I could smile at my life and also 
at my sickness” (ZC, p. 419) (seppi sorridere alla mia vita e anche alla 
mia malattia [CZ, p. 396]).
VI
A well-known fact is that Freud never dealt extensively with the topic of 
irony in his works, only mentioning it a handful of times in Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Unconscious.16 This omission, as Stringfellow has argued, is 
because Freud takes irony to be a purely rhetorical technique, one that 
is rationally chosen by the speaker, and which therefore bears no rela-
tion to the sort of internal censorship that we see in other dynamics of 
repression.17 Indeed, although Freud posits that jokes betray a certain 
“untrustworthy” usage of language, which “needs to have its justification 
examined,” he attributes this untrustworthiness to a deliberate sense of 
sophistry (Jokes, p. 61). But, if we apply a psychoanalytical model rather 
than a rhetorical one to the double logic of irony (thus privileging the 
incompatibility between intended and implied messages), we become 
aware that a level of unconscious meaning should exist on both levels, 
thus negating it as a purely intentional speech mode. “By assuming that 
a person means everything that she says, psychoanalysis can stay open 
to meanings that tend to be lost in a rhetorical analysis” (Stringfellow, 
p. 5, emphasis added).
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For Svevo, irony, illness, and laughter are thus aligned by the praxis 
of analysis, which reveals the internal ambiguities and contradictions in 
both speech and selfhood. In this alignment, they merge to encompass 
a position of detachment that then characterizes the ironist’s way of life. 
As he writes in the “Profilo autobiografico” from Racconti e scritti autobio-
grafici: “And after realizing that life is imprecise, obscured rather than 
clarified by our intentions that do not impact on it, we end up laughing at 
human activity in general” (my translation; emphasis added) (E scoprendo 
tanto imprecisa la nostra personalità piuttosto oscurata che chiarita dalle 
nostre intenzioni che non arrivano ad atteggiare la nostra vita, finiamo 
col ridere dell’attività umana in generale [p. 812, emphasis added]).
Here Svevo’s reception of Kierkegaardian irony leads him beyond 
Freud and toward anticipating the later writings of Jacques Lacan, which 
map the instruments of rhetoric onto the workings of the unconscious 
itself and thus deal in greater depth with irony, also in a self-reflexive 
way. “Freud provides [Lacan] with a guarantee that all thinking is ‘think-
ing other’: there is no stability, no stopping place, no supreme system. 
The speaking unconscious is a model for the intellectual life. Rather 
than create a monument and leave time, history or opinion to bring it 
down, Lacan writes works that displace and deconstruct themselves as 
they are produced.”18 This praxis of displacing meaning within his own 
works is also mirrored in Lacan’s attitude toward literary texts, which 
he considered “as inexhaustibly ambiguous and plural” (Bowie, p. 136).
For the link between the workings of the unconscious and rhetorical 
modes of speech (explicitly including irony) is key for Lacan and can 
provide further insight into the dynamics of the neurotic symptoms 
at stake. “Can one see here mere manners of speaking, when it is the 
figures themselves that are at work in the rhetoric of the discourse the 
analysand actually utters?”19 Within this system of dialectical displace-
ment that Lacan privileges, the significance of irony goes beyond its 
status as speech act and starts to yield insight into the construction 
and deconstruction of subjective identity itself. “Lacan’s analysis of the 
indirection of language is useful in explaining irony by showing how 
all language really points in the same direction, toward the question of 
self-identity.”20 This is because the subject is brought into being through 
the linguistic encounter with Other. “The Other is, therefore, the locus 
in which is constituted the I who speaks along with he who hears, what 
is said by the one being already the reply, the other deciding, in hearing 
[entendre] it, whether the one has spoken or not” (Lacan, p. 133). But 
as Malcolm Bowie says, this reciprocal relation is not always constitutive, 
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least of all when irony itself is involved. Indeed, in speaking ironically, 
the Other can also refuse to “yield a single sense; in each of its incarna-
tions it is that which introduces lack and gap into the operations of the 
subject and which, in doing so, incapacitates the subject for selfhood” 
(Bowie, p. 117).
Irony thus plays an important role in this nonconstitutive relation 
between Self and Other through language, since it is itself conceived of 
as emerging from the subject and yet going against, or even deceiving 
the Other. “What does irony say? It says that the Other does not exist, 
that the social link in its very foundation is a fraud, that there is no 
discourse which is not a false pretence.”21 This builds on Lacan’s belief 
that truth has the same structure as fiction, thus allowing the word to 
have the effect of fiction. As Bowie reminds us, for Lacan, contradiction 
and irony are inherent in language: “In Lacan’s view, the person who 
speaks and is satisfied with what he says is not simply misguided: he 
is wrong. Every statement that does not provoke change and strange-
ness within itself is wrong. Truth that seeks to remove itself from the 
contradictory process of language becomes falsehood there and then” 
(Bowie, pp. 127–28).
This breakdown in the intersubjective exchange of language and self-
hood that irony triggers thus intimates some kind of link with illness, 
or (more specifically) with neurotic symptoms—something that brings 
us back to the narrative motivations behind the writing of La coscienza 
di Zeno itself. As Paul Antze says: “Neurotic symptoms, such as ironic 
words or deeds, have a double meaning, one overt, the other hidden. 
. . . Because of their ambiguity, neurotic symptoms also lend themselves 
to the kind of covert commentary that we associate with irony—allowing 
the sufferer to express feelings in a way that escapes repercussions.”22
VII
What are the wider implications, then, of the ironist position that 
Svevo expounds through the voice of Zeno in La coscienza, a position 
that would appear to have been inspired by his reading of Kierkegaard? 
I have already discussed the textual significance of the destabiliza-
tion such a position engenders, which—by privileging a competition 
between different layers of meaning—seems to produce something 
of a narrative “underlife” that is itself akin to a type of neurosis. But 
following Antze’s argument in “Illness as Irony in Psychoanalysis,” we 
can also seek an alignment with what he terms “the ironic structure of 
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the analytic situation” (Antze, p. 103). Antze’s point is that despite the 
verbal nature of the therapy, what is not said, and what the patient tries 
to conceal, is of real interest to the analyst. The analyst’s role here is, 
therefore, to bring these “hidden voices” into a multiple conversation 
or “polylogue” that allows each voice to question, qualify, and “‘ironize’ 
the others” (Antze, p. 103, emphasis added).
Within the context of such a model the text of La coscienza can thus be 
seen as itself inherently resistant, since its multiple standpoints of mean-
ings imply a refusal of the possibility of a coherent interpretation. And 
this resistance at a textual level neatly mimics the resistance of Zeno’s 
own ironist position, which is precisely based on a knowledge differential 
between himself and his reader/analyst, and which consequently allows 
the protagonist to retain a deferred sense of intentionality and agency. 
This is an example of the sort of secondary gain in illness that can be 
enacted by the patient as a strategy for avoiding decisions or winning 
sympathy, and which can—in Antze’s words—be “a formidable clinical 
adversary” (Antze, p. 105). As Zeno himself says (paradoxically keeping 
open two strikingly different propositions): “It was not death I desired, 
but sickness, a sickness that would serve me as a pretext to do what I 
wanted, or that would prevent me from doing it” (ZC, p. 207) (Non la 
morte desideravo ma la malattia, una malattia che mi servisse da pre-
testo per fare quello che volevo, o che me lo impedisse [CZ, p. 194]).
The deliberate, intentional nature of this splitting gives rise to symp-
toms that characterize Zeno’s neurotic narrative, and which point pre-
cisely to a sense of intentionality that brings him the kind of potential 
advantage mentioned above. In La coscienza, this intentionality leads to an 
impulse toward repetition and reconstruction that aims at preventing the 
analyst from carrying out his work of solving the riddle of the distortion 
and disguise caused by the neurosis itself. And the way in which Zeno’s 
narrative resistance works here brings us back to Kierkegaard’s notion 
of irony as “a sickness in so far as it is unable to tolerate the absolute 
except in the form of nothingness, and yet this sickness is an endemic 
fever which but few individuals contract, and even fewer overcome.”23
Both Svevo’s and Kierkegaard’s work indicate a sense of pride in the 
refined rejection of the absolute, the existence of a stable truth that 
privileges illness as a dynamic and intentional stance. Svevo himself 
wrote of his desire to keep the gap between ignorance and knowledge 
(or indeed, conscious and unconscious thought) resolutely open, and 
resist the decoding impulse of analysis. As he wrote to Valerio Jahier on 
December 27, 1927: “And why should we want to cure our illness? Do we 
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really have to take away the best element of humanity?” (my translation) 
(E perché voler curare la nostra malattia? Davvero dobbiamo togliere 
all’umanità quello ch’essa ha di meglio?)24
Yet if the implications of this ironist stance are challenging for a read-
ing of La coscienza di Zeno, then the consequences for psychoanalysis itself 
are equally far-reaching, as Svevo himself surely realized. If we accept the 
lack of an absolute truth, or a total knowledge of self, then what in turn 
“insulates the analyst or psychoanalysis itself from the dramatic ironies 
of the unconscious”? (Antze, p. 119). Psychoanalysis itself, as practice, 
becomes inherently ironic by design. As Jacques-Alain Miller has said, 
“According to Lacan, psychoanalysis, following the path prescribed by 
Freud, restores irony in neurosis. It would be wonderful, in fact, to cure 
neurosis by irony. If we succeeded in curing neurosis by irony, we would 
not need to support it by psychoanalysis. But we are not yet cured of 
psychoanalysis, despite Lacan’s irony” (Miller, pp. 11–12).
I believe that this use of irony is where Svevo is remarkably forward 
thinking in his understanding of psychoanalysis as a potentially electrify-
ing narrative tool or matrix, and also where his reading of Kierkegaard 
helps him to elaborate an effective rejection of psychoanalysis as cure. 
As he writes to Jahier on December 10, 1927, “A great man, our Freud, 
but more so for novelists than for actual sufferers” (Carteggio, p. 239, my 
translation) (Grande uomo quel nostro Freud, ma piú per i romanzieri 
che per gli ammalati). Indeed, this proposition, which links Kierkegaard 
and Svevo, is perhaps the first recorded realization of how psychoanalysis, 
in the words of Adam Phillips, “becomes an ironic critique . . . a primer 
of necessary ignorance, a reminder of the ironies of knowledge.”25
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